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Book Reviews 
MIDDLE GROUND? 
SAME SEX DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES. By Andrew 
Koppelman. 1 Yale University Press. 2006. Pp. xviii + 204. 
Hardback $35.00. 
Patrick J. Borcher/ 
Andrew Koppelman, Professor of Law and Political Science 
at Northwestern University, is one of the most prolific and influ-
ential commentators on the same-sex marriage debate and the 
conflict-of-laws questions that it presents. His thoughtful and 
well-written book, entitled Same, Sex, Different States: When 
Marriages Cross State Lines,3 is an important contribution to this 
literature. 
The book draws on Koppelman's earlier writings on the 
same-sex marriage issue, the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
"DOMA",4 and related topics. In it he attempts to stake a middle 
ground between the "pro-recognition" and the "anti-recognition" 
camps with regard to same-sex marriages solemnized in states or 
nations that allow such unions. 
One of the most admirable features of the book is that it 
avoids overstating its case or embracing any of the easy solutions 
that, while appealing to one side or the other, do not hold up to 
scrutiny. Thus Koppelman quite rightly rejects the "Full Faith 
1. Professor of Law. Northwestern University. 
2. Vice President for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law. Creighton Univer-
sity. 
3. ANDREW KOPPELMAN. SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LiNES (2006). 
4. Pub. L. No. 104-1'!'!. 110 Stat. 241'! (1'!'!6) (codified in part at 2H U.S.C. § 173HC 
(2006)). 
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and Credit" solution advanced by the pro-recognition camp that 
dominated the popular press and some law review articles writ-
ten shortlr after the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr 
v. Lewin. That decision, which appeared likely to make the 
Aloha State the first to allow same-sex marriages, provoked the 
federal DOMA, which Koppelman quite rightly notes was aimed 
at a mostly imaginary target (pp. 116-18). 
The far-fetched notion that led to the federal DOMA was 
that same-sex marriage would be a sort of card trick in which 
one card is flipped over and the whole rest of the deck follows. 6 
As Koppelman quite rightly notes, this argument depended on a 
thorough confusion of what constitutes a "judgment" for full-
faith-and-credit purposes (p. 118). For a marriage to have this 
"card trick" effect, it would have to involve the actual resolution 
of disputed issues. But, of course, the decision to enter into a 
marriage is not a disputed matter in the way that a divorce can 
be. It's simply not the case that Pat wants to get married to Fran, 
but Fran doesn't want to get married to Pat, and they have to go 
to a judge who will then decide whether they are to be married 
or not. 
On the other end of the spectrum is the solution advanced 
by some in the anti-recognition camp. That camp proposes to 
amend the U.S. Constitution to ban same-sex marriages. Al-
though opinion polls show that a large majority of Americans 
are opposed to same-sex marriage in principle,7 it seems unlikely 
that the political will to amend the Constitution exists. More-
over, since opposition to same-sex marriage is much weaker 
among younger adults, the solution of amending the Constitu-
tion seems unlikely to gain momentum with the passage of time 
(p. 152). 
With total victory for either side out of reach, the question 
to which Koppelman addresses himself is how best to mediate 
the kulturkampf between the small number of states who have 
institutionalized same-sex unions8 and the 40 or so states who 
have by positive law expressed their opposition (p. 138). 
5. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
6. See Patrick J. Borchers. Baker v. General Motors: lmpliwtions }in lnterjurisdiL-
tional Rewgnition of Non- Traditional Marriages. 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147. 152-54 
(1998). 
7. /d. at 150. 
8. Prompted by their state high courts. currently Vermont and New Jersey have 
laws that confer essentially all the benefits of marriage on same-sex couples who go 
through a "civil union" ceremony. Massachusetts has by decree of the Supreme Judicial 
Court extended its marriage laws to include same-sex couples. The developments in 
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The engine driving the potential for policy disputes is the lex 
loci celebrationis (or "the law of the place of the celebration") rule 
in the conflict of laws. The general rule, from time immemorial, 
has been that a marriage that is valid under the law of the state in 
which it is celebrated is valid everywhere.9 This raises the possi-
bility that once a state recognizes same-sex marriage (and, unlike 
Massachusetts, does not have a "marriage evasion" statute 10), 
couples barred from marrying in their home states will travel to 
states that allow their marriages and then return home and claim 
the status of a married couple. Now, as noted above and several 
times by Koppelman, this is not a rule of constitutional compul-
sion. The place-of-celebration rule has always been subject to a 
public policy exception which has allowed states to refuse to rec-
ognize out-of-state marriages against which the state has a 
deeply-felt policy.'' 
The same-sex marriage debate is not, of course, the first 
such policy conflict to present these quandaries. Before the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia 12 struck down state laws 
barring inter-racial marriages, states that barred such unions 
faced similar questions with inter-racial couples who had been 
validly married elsewhere. Koppelman carefully plumbs these 
cases for lessons they might teach but is, again, careful to not 
overstate his case by claiming that they present a perfect analogy 
(p. 49). 
Koppelman usefully groups marriage questions into four 
different classes. 13 One is "Evasive Marriages" in which a couple 
Vermont and Massachusetts are discussed extensively (pp. 8-11). The New Jersey Su-
preme Court decision is Lewis v. Harris. '}08 A.2d 1% (N.J. 2006). In a divided decision. 
the high court of New York recently rejected the argument that its state constitution con-
fers a right of same-sex marriage. See Hernandez v. Robles. 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006). 
'}_ Borchers, supra note 6. at 154-58. 
10. In Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health. 844 N.E.2d 623 (Mass. 2006), the Su-
preme Judicial Court upheld the Massachusetts marriage evasion statute in application to 
out-of-state same-sex couples domiciled in states that prohibit same-sex marriage. 
11. Borchers. supra note 6. at 157-58. 
12. 388 U.S. 1 (1'}67). 
13. One quibble I have with Koppelman's taxonomy is that the willingness of courts 
to sustain attacks on marriages has always tended to depend on whether the marriage 
was being challenged by one of the parties to the marriage or by a third party whose 
rights depended upon the validity of the marriage. such as in questions of inheritance. See 
Borchers. supra note 6. at 157. Thus. for instance. in Chapter 2 Koppelman discusses at 
length the famous case of Wilkins v. Zelichowski. 140 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1 '}58). in which a wife 
who was underage under the law of her domicile was able to annul a marriage that was 
apparently valid where celebrated. Koppelman uses Wilkins as an example of the public 
policy doctrine invalidating what he would categorize as an "evasive" marriage. How-
ever. similarly "evasive" marriages have been upheld against attack on public policy 
grounds probably because the party attacking it was not one of the spouses. See, e.g .. In 
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domiciled in a state that does not allow for same-sex marriages 
travels to a state that allows them to get married and then re-
turns home (pp. 102-06). A second is "Migratory Marriages" in 
which a couple is genuinely domiciled in a state that allows their 
union but then later re-domiciles in a state that prohibits their 
marriage (pp. 106-10). A third is "Visitor Marriages" in which a 
couple validly married under the law of their home state is visit-
ing in a state that does not allow same-sex marriages but has 
need during the visit to take advantage of one of the incidents of 
the marriage, for instance, a right to make health care decisions 
for an incapacitated spouse (pp. 110-11 ). The fourth is "Extra-
territorial Marriages" in which a legal relation in a state other 
than the couple's marital domicile turns on their marital status 
(pp. 112-13). An example here might be an intestate beneficiary 
living in a state that does not allow same-sex marriages whose 
right to inherit turns upon whether a same-sex couple living in a 
state that permits such marriages is treated as married. 
At the risk of over-simplification, Koppelman proposes a 
reorientation of marriage law away from the place-of-
celebration nexus to a domiciliary nexus. Thus he argues that 
states who prohibit same-sex marriages should be free to ignore 
evasive marriages but that they should recognize marriages in 
the visitor and extraterritorial cases. In the migratory case he 
proposes that states which prohibit same-sex marriages be al-
lowed to refuse to recognize them as marriages subject to their 
recognizing some of the incidents of the marriage, particularly 
those that he terms "non-marital" rights, i.e., ones that could be 
created in the absence of a marriage (p. 110). 
re May's Estate. 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953). Koppelman also at one point (pp. 23-24). 
stretches the traditional public policy doctrine beyond its bounds when he criticizes the 
New York Court of Appeals' decision in Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft. 14 
N.E.2d 79H (N.Y. 193H). Although all can agree that the dreadful Nazi-era laws involved 
in that case violated every norm of natural justice. the public policy defense was always 
limited to preventing enforcement of foreign rights that violated the forum's public pol-
icy (such as those involving foreign marriages). It had never been understood to allow 
the rejection or a foreign defense to essentially create a right of action that would not 
have been known under foreign law. Thus, had Holzer involved the German company 
attempting to claim a breach of contract against the plaintiff Holzer, rather than the 
other way around. I have little doubt but that New York's high court would have dis-
missed the German company's suit on public policy grounds. Koppelman. however. has 
distinguished company in this view as the New York Court of Appeals so stretched the 
public policy doctrine in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961) to 
reject the Massachusetts limitation on wrongful death recovery. This. however. was a 
short-lived innovation as two years later New York adopted a version of interest analysis 
for resolve conflicts and essentially recast Kilherg as an interest analysis case. See Bab-
cock v. Jackson. 191 !'<.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). However. no part of Koppelman's central 
argument depends to any great degree on these points. 
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It is conceivable that such a reorientation, or at least a par-
tial one, might take place. In my first writing on the same-sex 
marriage debate, I suggested, in what Koppelman would call the 
"migratory" case, that even non-recognizing states might well 
give some effect to such marriages. 14 
The real question, however, as Koppelman notes, is the col-
lision between his proposed reorientation and many of the state 
statutes and constitutional amendments (often called "mini-
DOMAs) (pp. 137-48) that were drafted not only to make clear 
that marriages must be of the opposite-sex variety but also ad-
dressed the conflict-of-laws issues that might be presented by 
same-sex marriages validly celebrated in other states. Many of 
these statutes appear to prohibit the reorientation that Koppel-
man proposes and would prevent recognition even in the visitor 
and extraterritorial cases (pp. 146-48). 
The coming collision, Koppelman argues (correctly, in my 
view) is between some of these more expansive mini-DOMAs 
and the U.S. Supreme Court's line of cases beginning with Ro-
mer v. Evans. 15 Romer invalidated Colorado's "Amendment 2" 
which prohibited homosexuals from claiming any special status 
under state or local law. Romer is an extraordinarily slippery 
case that has led some lower courts to declare mini-DOMAs un-
constitutional.16 The Court's opinion is slippery because its hold-
ing that Colorado's amendment lacked any "rational basis" is 
difficult to cabin unless one is willing to accept the proposition 
that homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class for equal 
protection purposes, a view the Romer majority apparently dis-
claimed.17 
In any event, however, Romer's relationship to the same-sex 
marriage debate seemed attenuated as long as Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 18 the Supreme Court decision upholding Georgia's sodomy 
law, remained good law. For if states were allowed to criminalize 
same-sex sex without running afoul of the Constitution, it was 
difficult (to say the least) to imagine how the Constitution could 
14. Borchers. supra note o. at 185 ("I suspect that many states will give some effect 
to same-sex marriages even if they don't give them full effect. and the effect they give 
may depend on the circumstances of the marriage."). 
15. 517 u.s. o20 (l'l'lo). 
16. See, e.g.. Citizens for Equal Protection. Inc. v. Bruning. 3o8 F. Supp. 2d '180 (D. 
Neb. 2005). rev'd 455 F.3d 85'1 (8th C!r. 200o). 
17. Romer.517U.S.at630-31. 
18. 478 u.s. 186 (1 'li\6). 
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compel them to recognize same-sex marriages or even to give 
them partial effect. 
But then came Lawrence v. Texas, 19 in which the Court 
struck down Texas's sodomy law and expressly overruled Bow-
ers. The question of the effect of Romer and its progeny on 
same-sex marriages is now a much closer one. As Justice Scalia 
noted in his Lawrence dissent, the logic of the majority's opinion 
seems to cut away many of the constitutional obstacles to the in-
stitutional recognition of same-sex marriage, 20 to say nothing of 
Koppelman's more moderate proposal of partial recognition. 
I will venture no prediction as to whether the Supreme 
Court will extend Romer far enough to pave the way for Kop-
pelman's proposed reorientation. However, the same slippery 
slope that has worked to the advantage of the pro-recognition 
camp by bringing about Lawrence and setting up the arguments 
for the Romer line's extension may become its enemy. Some of 
the force of the argument in favor of same-sex marriage would 
seem to apply as well to other minority sexual unions. 21 Of 
course, there may well be principled ways in which to distinguish 
same-sex unions from other minority unions. But probably those 
distinctions will have to be made clear before we see widespread 
judicial acceptance of even Koppelman's middle ground. 
However the future unfolds, Same Sex, Different States: 
When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines is a significant and 
positive addition to the discussion. 
19. 539 u.s. 55i\ (2003). 
20. !d. at 600 (Scalia. J .. dissenting) (referring to the equal protection argument 
against laws forbidding sodomy: "But this cannot itself be a denial of equal protection. 
since it is precisely the same distinction regarding partner that is drawn in state laws pro-
hibiting marriage with someone of the same sex while permitting marriage with someone 
of the opposite sex."). 
21. Two obvious examples are sexual unions between adult siblings and polyga-
mous unions. Although less common than same-sex unions, such unions are not rare. See, 
e.g .. Blood Ties. THE GUARDIAN. Feb. 28. 2007. p. 12 (detailing relationship between 
German brother and sister that resulted in the birth of four children and discussing their 
efforts to challenge the provision in the German civil code criminalizing their sexual rela-
tionship and noting that Sweden apparently allows marriages between half-siblings). 
Sexual attraction between adult siblings is apparently common if the siblings were raised 
apart. See Nigel Hawkes, Tahoo of lncesl Explained hy Re/acive Boredom, THE TIMES. 
Apr. 3. 1995. In some states. polygamous unions are estimated to account for as much as 
2% of the population. See Ucah Paying a High Price for Polygamy; Law: Child ahuse and 
we/ji1re fraud are pare of plural marriage's col/, LA. TIMES, Sep. 9. 2001. p. A 1. The possi-
bility for a constitutional challenge to laws prohibiting polygamous marriages is more 
than theoretical. In State v. Holm. 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006), the Utah Supreme Court in 
a split decision upheld against a Lawrence challenge a bigamy prosecution of a man who 
after lawfully marrying his first wife entered into a marriage-like ceremony with another 
woman and then later the 16-year-old sister of his first wife. 
